Let's Continue To Support China's Extra-Territorial Control of Australian Social Media (😳)
The Parliamentary Inquiry "Foreign Interference Through Social Media" is asking for submissions. It will get submissions from the usual players. But don't expect action from Government.澳洲人站起来！
How much of Australian social media should the Chinese dictatorship control ?
At the last election, all political parties (bar the Democratic Alliance), supported the status quo - which we (very) crudely estimate at 10 % CCP control. This is based on an educated guess of 80 % of Chinese Australians using WeChat and Weibo for news and information (4% of Australia’s population), and Tiktok accounting for 6 % of population coverage.1
Are you ok with 90 % free speech, 10 % CCP control ?
Former PM Morrison was censored (2020) attempting to explain the Australian governments position to Chinese language readers on WeChat. Later he had his channel removed (2022). Liberal MPs ceased engagement with WeChat.
Instead of a show of unity from all nominally democratic parties and independents, Australia was successfully divided into those who submit to China’s censorship and public opinion guidance, and those who did not.
Unaffected or CCP supported politicians happily took advantage of the CCP’s media assistance in the 2022 Federal election.
We are already seeing a change in behaviour and tone from the remaining or aspiring Liberal MP’s.
Victory for the CCP. Defeat for Australia.
China’s extra-territorial control of Australian social media breaks into two categories:
1 CCP Directly Controlled Social Media in Australia:
Wechat
Weibo
Bilibili (video)
Tik Tok
The above media apps are directly subject to CCP censorship2 and CCP directed public opinion 舆论引导 / public feeling guidance舆情引导.3
2 CCP Influenced Social Media in Australia:
Linked in
Youtube
Meta assets (Facebook / Instagram)
Twitter
Reddit
Social Media the dictatorship does not control, is a battleground (public opinion struggle) (舆论斗争 / yú lùn dòu zhēng)4 that they are winning. They win by:
Intimidating moderators into moderating according to CCP censorship requirements: The stand out example of this is Linked-in who censored users outside China in order to protect access to the China market.5
Flooding the media with messaging they control, through state media, subsidised and directed lifestyle6 7influencers who may be 90 % non-political, and foreign faces8 that appear to be independent but are actually groomed and promoted by Chinese media agencies.
Downvoting and spurious complaints making it harder to view the heroes fighting the information war, by making their contributions harder to find or demonetized, damaging their business model. It’s hard to fight for democracy if you can’t find the money for lunch.
Targeted harassment campaigns9 of repetitive insulting and abusive messaging to wear down the victim and act as a warning to others who might agree to them. The messages can be generated faster than they can be deleted where moderators act to moderate. This is reinforced by detailed defamatory “news articles” circulated in Chinese controlled media like WeChat that cannot be rebutted or challenged by legal means.
What Then, Is To Be Done?
Generic strategies covering all social media the same way may not be possible. We may need to “discriminate” between CCP directly controlled social media, and other social media.
CCP Directly Controlled Social Media:
Option 1. Outright banning of CCP Directly Controlled Social Media
Option 2. The media organisation pays for an Australian based moderation team accountable to a newly created Australian Free Speech Defenders Office (AFSDO) under rules similar to Australian film and television censorship rules, but with the capacity to label or censor blatantly false CCP propaganda (eg Fort Detrick Covid misinformation).
It would mainly serve to facilitate the spreading of non-CCP narratives and defending ourselves through reasoned argument - defending our currently denied “dialogue rights” (话语权) 10 in our own country.
Option 3. Accept the status quo. Do nothing. Let's Continue To (tacitly) Support China's Extra-Territorial Control of Chinese owned Social Media in Australia.
Ban WeChat (etc) ?
Despite Pre-emptive propaganda to the contrary, there is no mainstream discussion of banning WeChat, yet.
Arguments opposing a ban often centre on its use as a “popular” means of communication.
I gave up using Apple FaceTime with people in China as it mysteriously seemed slow and inefficient, while Video discussion using WeChat works fine.
Gmail and other non-Chinese email and messaging services at times seem slow when communicating with China, whereas messaging via WeChat works reliably.
You’d almost think WeChat was a superior service.
It’s not. The foreign services are hindered. This is the fault of the Chinese authorities, not us. If we ban WeChat tomorrow and people can’t communicate with relatives or friends in China, that’s China’s fault, don’t flip the narrative and pin that on us.
All of the news services provided by WeChat, would exist separately on different websites or apps. They may have problems of CCP influence too, but that’s a separate issue for another day. If you ban WeChat tomorrow, people can still get news in Chinese.
People lived happily without WeChat, Weibo, before, they can live happily without it again. Can kids who grew up with TikTok live without it ?
Enforce Moderation Consistent With Other Australian Media Law ?
This (option 2 above), involves moderation activity in Australia, by Australians for Australians and under Australian law, paid for by Chinese social media organisations.
Instead of letting the CCP censor and manage us.
It’s a good faith attempt to work out a way to let the apps operate, while reinstating the rights we are supposed to have. I never voted to cede censorship and public opinion management in Australia to the CCP.
This won’t work of course because China will not cooperate.
Do Nothing ?
We will continue to (tacitly) support China's extra-territorial control of Chinese owned Social media in Australia, because if one politician or party support one of the actions described above (or something better), then the incentives are aligned for their competitors to undermine the national interest for their narrow personal or party interest, and oppose it.
If the decision makers all make the same decision, they don’t get benefit for themselves. If they go out on a limb, act boldly and decisively, they will be undermined by others. The most tempting option, the safe option, for all decision makers, is to do nothing, and tacitly accept the cession of Australia’s information sovereignty. Strategists call it the “prisoners dilemma” from Game Theory. Others call it “divide and rule”.
CCP Influenced (non Chinese) Australian Social Media:
Option 1. Outright ban China origin media content
Option 2. Australian Free Speech Defenders Office (AFSDO) to have staff embedded in non Chinese Australian social media, monitoring Chinese origin media, gathering data, making recommendations to the social media company and reporting to the AFSDO. The aim is to attempt to allow Chinese participation while frustrating CCP influence attempts.11
Option 3: Accept the status quo. Do nothing. Let's Continue To (tacitly) Support China's Extra-Territorial Influence of non-Chinese owned Social Media in Australia.
Scorched Earth ?
Option 1 is a nuclear option, that would eliminate a lot of harmless or useful content only to restrict a small percentage of content that is of concern.
Aussie Big Brother ?
Option 2 constitutes active interference in the moderation process to understand and minimise the effect of authoritarian interference and influence in Australia.
It is aimed at making it possible for voices other than those conducting information warfare against us, to have a say, with less hindrance and harassment than is currently the case.
Do Nothing ?
Same as the previous discussion, the information sovereignty crisis festers, and things get worse, and people accept Chinese control as normal, like in Universities.
What Then, Is To Be Done, By Whom ?
Ideally we would ban Chinese controlled social media, to show we are serious.
Then, negotiate options like the two option 2’s, where Australian information sovereignty (protection of freedom of speech) is upheld on our territory.
If agreement is reached, rescind the ban subject to the new moderation system.
Agreement is unlikely to be reached, as China would see it as setting a precedent that could be copied around the world and amount to a threat to the CCP not only outside but inside China.
So banning it would be the endgame, if the Australian government and MP’s outside the government were united in pursuing Australia’s interest, and did not fear being undermined by each other.
For politicians, think tanks, journalists, academics, and industry lobbyists, talk is not cheap but they get paid for it. When the inquiry is over they will move on to the next item of business. They still get paid.
In the current environment, nothing is going to happen. There will need to be an alliance of groups who understand the need for reform and a willingness to incur costs achieve it.
Costs means time, effort, lost friends and lost business or job opportunities. There is no business model for fighting autocracy. It’s time for you to step up.
There needs to be an organisation formed to work for this cause. The inquiry is now and the time to take action is now.
It should participate with written submissions and direct appeals to the list of MP’s associated with the inquiry.
It should generate publicity in traditional and social media.
The organisation should develop and demonstrate the capacity to take direct action.
This includes:
Public appeals and petitions to Apple and Google to pull the offending apps from their app stores.
Reinforce this with protests outside their stores and offices. Study the tactics used by the radical end of the Green movement and use this selectively.
Shame advertisers and public figures in Australia who support CCP controlled social media or who collaborate with propaganda units (eg People’s Daily) or CCP funded influencers. Attach costs to their actions.
Loss in this battle cannot be end of the matter. As long as the CCP divides Australia with misinformation and persuades the nation to make decisions that serve CCP interests against our own, this issue will continue to fester like a gangrenous sore.
Amputate or sterilise, but doing nothing is not a solution.
It is defeat.
Make your submissions to the Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media.
If Chinese Australians are 5 % of the population and we assume 80 % rely on Chinese Controlled Social Media QED 4% of the population are subject to Chinese censorship and public opinion guidance efforts. 100 % of the Australian Chinese I know rely on Chinese Social Media. 6% of 18-65 year olds say Tiktok is their favourite social media platform, subject to the same pernicious controls as the Chinese language social media apps.
Tik Tok blatantly censors content, in Australia, that does not support the Chinese dictatorships propaganda.
如何理解新闻舆论工作各个方面、各个环节都要坚持正确舆论导向？ Everything, even advertisements, must be guided by the party. Not just news.
Linked in 2014 (Guardian). and Linked in (The Australian) Note that they may have walked back from their previous position in recent years, as awareness of these issues grows.
借嘴说话 borrow mouths to speak - an official CCP strategy to get foreigners to create social media to shill for China.
Smart Asian Women are the new targets of CCP global online repression (ASPI 3 June 2022)
话语权 （discourse rights ) is a concept of a right to speak or a right to be heard. When used by Chinese authorities it connotes passively digesting and accepting the CCP narrative about China or world events.
This could be generalised to include other actors as well, eg Russia, Iran, and many small countries that fly under the radar, eg Cambodia.