A Baby Step in The Long March to Reclaim Australian Digital Sovereignty.

The recent parliamentary inquiry on Foreign Interference Through Social Media released its findings and recommendations on . What happens next ?

The Senate Inquiry Into Foreign Interference Through Social Media has handed down it’s report and recommendations.

What They Did Not Do:

They did not discuss the censorship of a former PM by a foreign dictatorship on WeChat.

They did not discuss the use of WeiBo by Kevin Rudd to have an unchallenged communication channel to 700 000 Chinese language readers.

They claimed that there was no evidence of foreign interference through social media in the 2022 Federal Election¹, which is frankly odd. Anyone using WeChat for information was fed a narrative of Labor being more disposed to acceding to Chinese demands and demonisation of the coalition and their stand on China related issues.

CCP controlled media, including social media, barracked for Teals, Greens, Australian Citizens Party, - anything but the coalition in a manner that would make Rupert Murdoch blush.

My submission covered these topics but largely focused on the damage unchallenged influence of CCP media could do, and the need to have the right of rebuttal, as a PM or an ordinary citizen.

What They Did Do:

They did focus on intelligence and data gathering, harassment, misinformation (wrong information) and disinformation (deliberately wrong information).

They did expose the attitude of TikTok and WeChat to scrutiny and questioning. TikTok engaged only when forced, and gave nonsense replies to questions asked. WeChat refused.

WeChat’s attitude seems to be:

We can censor a PM, why attend a parliamentary inquiry ?

Their goal is for us to tacitly acknowledge that they are above Australian law. So far we have consistently complied, creating this behavioural norm (acceptance of Chinese interests being above Australian law).

While they did not directly consider a proposed government bill² to deal with misinformation and disinformation in social media, they do seem to have taken it into account. Some of their recommendations could be included in this existing draft bill to strengthen it. The report may add weight to actually making the bill get passed and implemented.

There was focus on transparency and minimal censorship³, and avoiding a heavy handed approach. Yet many witnesses⁴ suggested creating rules that social media must comply with, with bans being the final step if the organisations refuse to comply.

Obviously, Chinese apps will refuse to comply or even engage, so the end game, would actually be bans should we attempt to impose Australian law on Chinese social media operating in Australia.

Directly or indirectly, there is only the voice of the Party, in every forum, on every topic in Chinese controlled social media.

There is no one size fits all platform neutral solution. The recommendations around transparency suit social media that are not based in a dictatorship. Social media based in party dictatorships (China) or personal dictatorships (Russia) cannot be allowed to label everything as “state media - watch out !” and not permit any other voice - and then we say this is ok. It would remain a joke. But a platform neutral solution is what they recommended.

In the unlikely event that many of the recommendations were acted on, it could lead to a positive evolutionary process. We would inevitably find the measures insufficient, and that would provoke us in future to develop more specific and actionable measures, but with teeth.

Viewed in this light, the report should be commended, as a baby step in the long march to recovery of narrative sovereignty⁵.

The Actual Recommendations:

Recommendation 1: Transparency

8:43 Transparency Requirements, enforceable with fines, potential to ban.

Use of the “b” word⁶ here is important, as scare campaigns from the pro-authoritarian left⁷ have focused on banning various apps. While generally undesirable, the government cannot negotiate effectively with China without having this threat in its arsenal.

8:44 Gives sensible specific transparency related measures that should be compulsory, although one of these is bizarre:

“must disclose any instances where a platform removes or takes adverse action against an elected official’s account”.

So if Meta and Alphabet, in support of the US government propaganda goals, block PM Anthony Albanese from communicating with Australians on any of their platforms (Facebook, Instagram, Threads, Google search, YouTube), then this is ok (?), so long as they disclose it ?

I don’t think much of Albo, but he is the democratically elected head of my nation, the indirect leadership choice of a majority of our people. If another nation uses its power over social media to restrict his ability to communicate with our citizens, this is an attack on me, it represents an attack on my country.

Same if China “cancels” former PM Morrison and stops him communicating on WeChat with his fellow Australian citizens. In the entire report this incredible event was never raised, and this is the only measure to “address” it.

Recommendation 2: Apps Based In Authoritarian States:

8:61 If US forces ByteDance to divest TikTok, we should do the same.

Recommendation 3: Apps On Government Devices:

Tik Tok is no longer permitted on government devices, the committee suggest this ban should be extended to anyone working with government who has clearances similar to a government employee, ie contractors.

Recommendation 4: WeChat Should Be Treated The Same Way.

Oddly, no other Chinese apps like WeiBo or BiliBili are mentioned, yet would be expected to hold the same risks.

Recommendation 5: Continuous Audit

Deals with the need to give ongoing device security guidance on apps to the public service.

Recommendation 6: National Security Technology Office

Build an organisation within Home Affairs to study existing and new apps as they emerge and advise on risk mitigation in the context of government devices.

Recommendation 7: Lead Agency

Creation of an entity to lead whole of government efforts to counter cyber enabled foreign interference.

Recommendation 8: 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy

Add foreign interference to this existing strategy under development.

Recommendation 9: Magnitsky Sanctions

Clarify and ensure that Magnitsky sanctions can in fact be applied in foreign interference cases that involve social media.

Recommendation 10: Review National Security Legislation 2018:

Ensure that the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018, is effective as a weapon in cases of cyber enabled foriegn interference.

Recommendation 11: Artificial Intelligence

Somehow, the Australian government should deal with AI generated foreign interference.

Recommendation 12: Intelligence Briefings

Vet personnel of social media companies to have a trusted point of contact to receive threat intelligence briefings and interact with government agencies.

Obviously impossible in companies like WeChat and TikTok that have CCP party representatives working to push party goals, but in meta, google, and other non China based social media, it may be workable. Highlights the need for a two track approach, one for media based in authoritarian nations, one for media in open societies.

Recommendation 13: Support Independent Research

Company self reporting will be biased by what they want people to think. Governments will want to control the information flow for their own goals. Independent researchers can often shed light on what is happening in the different media apps.

Recommendation 14: Protecting Diaspora Communities:

After listing examples of harassment and using important phrases like “whole of nation” this proposal fizzles into “increasing public awareness of transnational repression”. Doesn’t actually include methods of redress or fighting back.

Recommendation 15: Empower and Educate Citizens

Essentially this is about home language assistance to non-english speaking citizens who may be targets of foreign interference.

Recommendation 16 : Support Non-English Language Journalism

Compete with the Chinese or Russian or Iranian dictatorship’s narrative, but not on their wholly controlled social media apps.

Recommendation 17: Assist neighbouring countries

PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji, basically all of the South Pacific is an ideological battleground and China wants to gain friends and turn the Pacific against us. Social and traditional media are the tools to do this, so if they will cooperate, helping friendly governments deal with this is in their and our interests.

REACTIONS:

The immediate reactions are the official comments from the parties representatives, in the document itself:

Additional Comments from Government Senators:

Government Senators welcome the committees core focus on transparency measures⁸, and appear relieved and claim bans were not supported⁹ by evidence to the committee.

In fact many witnesses identified the need for the power to ban the apps if they could not be made to follow Australian law.

8.34 p 168 Dr Seth Kaplan: “up to a ban”

8.36 Cyber CX “final say”

8.37 AHRC “Mandatory Requirements”

Kaplan argues “I’m generally in favour of a ban (re WeChat): April 20 2023 SMH article .

Fergus Ryan “I don’t think that a ban of WeChat or TikTok should ever be taken off the table,” he told the committee (same SMH article).

Government Senators noted that a whole of government approach is required (1.18) and proceed to contradict the idea that a new agency (Rec. 6, National Security Technology Office) is required to focus on foreign interference through social media and coordinate across government.

If the government do indeed have this covered with existing arrangements, that’s great. But it will require the opposition to monitor the success of this, since the report specifically recommended a new approach.

Australian Greens’ Additional Comments:

The Greens do not appear to be across the issues and (1.3) oppose “targeting a single platform based on the country it is linked to”.

While I and others do support different approaches to social media companies depending on whether they are controlled by dictatorships or not, the parliamentary inquiry committee broadly supported platform neutral approaches.

The straw man that Chinese are being victimised is a strategy that we can reasonably expect from supporters of the Chinese dictatorship and those soliciting positive coverage in WeChat and other CCP controlled media, to get votes, or other benefit.

More bizarre, the Greens stated that they oppose the banning of any app, including TikTok (1.4), from government devices. Government employees can use their own phone in their own time to look at Tik Tok or WeChat.

Promoting the idea that it is important for government owned and supplied phones to permit a particular commercial app (data intrusive or otherwise), is really going out on a limb to support CCP interference and surveillance objectives.

Public servants should be working, not doom scrolling. Ban all apps and games from employer provided devices !

Public Comments:

Labor MP Sally Sitou

click for Sitou’s Twitter post:

On the one hand she is talking the talk about taking it seriously, but then quickly segueing into demonising Paterson¹⁰ and padding out the same straw man as the Greens - inferring that this is attacking Chinese people. “Casting a general air of suspicion over particular communities” is a unique idea she is introducing to the discussion and completely at odds with the tone of the report.

Expect personal attacks on James Paterson to pick up over the next few weeks.

Former Morrison and Turnbull adviser Mark Ward said:

WeChat was a major threat, while Labor wanted instead to crack down on Facebook and Twitter for publishing “misinformation and disinformation”.

“Why not ban WeChat instead, which allows the Chinese Communist Party to spew misinformation directly into a worrying number of Australian households?”

Now What ?

Chinese apps cannot be made to follow Australian law. If they comply with our requirements it sets an example that Canada or other countries might follow. Standing up to China on Social Media will require:

• Knowing exactly what we want their apps to do, to be allowed to exist.

• Wielding the credible threat of banning them.

• Coordinated international action, bring together other large nations with significant Chinese social media using populations. If possible avoid negotiating as a single country against the behemoth.

• Start quietly. Present demands in private meetings and give the CCP leadership the chance to save face and make the changes we require, as if it was their choice. It probably won’t work, but don’t give Kevin Rudd the chance to accuse us of “chest thumping¹¹”, and work to undermine Australia’s negotiating position, again.

News of Barley import bans being rescinded broke in the same week as the report was published. It may be coincidence, but underscores the threat, that if we exercise our sovereignty on social media, China will punish us economically.

Any moves to exercise our sovereignty to fight back against Chinese interference / influence in social media, will be met by resistance from and by:

• businesses active in China or with Chinese interests

• universities with large numbers of Chinese students

• politicians with a large proportion of Chinese constituents who get their opinions from WeChat

• Chinese media attacking proponents of Australian social media reform

• Allies of CCP using other media to attack proponents of reform

• trade threats, and imposition of new bans.

• (re)freeze in diplomatic communication

• increase in brinkmanship behaviour in the South China Sea and elsewhere with our naval and airforce encounters

• efforts to use international organisations against us, such as using the UN to list places like the Great Barrier Reef as endangered.

They will get creative and fight us on every different front they can think of.

So don’t expect government to act in ways that are against their personal and party interests.

But If ?

Imagine a national security crisis, for example military action against Taiwan, leads China to seize control of iron ore territories in order to ensure supply.

Or they sink a ship, or cause an Australian aircraft to crash in the South China Sea as part of the continued incremental escalation against Freedom of Navigation operations…..

Do we still allow China to control the narrative in Chinese language media in Australia during a crisis with China ? How bad does the situation need to get ?And if we wait until a crisis to act, will it have been too little too late ?¹²

you might like:

1. there were foiled attempts at foreign interference in the 2022 election, although officially social media’s role is not documented.

2. 8.19 page 166 Communications Legislation Amendment Bill 2023 (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation).

3. 8:27 page 167

4. p 168 Seth Kaplan “including up to a ban”, Cyber CX “(Australian) government has the final say”, AHRC “offence to censor content not publicly disclosed to users”

5. By which I mean narratives based on fact, part of a contest of ideas, NOT the CCP’s “Telling China’s Story Well” unchallengeable narratives which dominate all Chinese controlled social media.

6. b for “ban”

7. Sun Wan Ning et al:

8. 1.6 page 169

9. 1.13, and 1.14, 1.15

10. Senator James Paterson, Lib Vic. Chair of the inquiry.

11. Rudd’s phrase to describe politicians talking plainly and openly to the Australian people.

12. It’s called a rhetorical question. Of course it’s too late.