How Should Politicians Deal With CCP Related Organisations ? Part 2 of 4
Developing a Code of Conduct for MP’s Dealing With Different Categories of Influence. Part 2 of 4. Published 29 July 2022.
Politicians must counter CCP influence and support our comprehensive national policy (foreign policy, sovereignty protection, and much more), and recognise that China policy is not something external directed from Canberra, it is substantially domestic and they are not divorced from it, but are on the front line.
A discussion of influence is beyond the scope of a short article but the actions politicians should take relate to the specific form of influence they are dealing with.
Below are four main categories of Chinese Influence that a politician might encounter, and initial proposals for a Code of Conduct for individual political representatives. The code of conduct for individual politicians should flow from an overall strategy implemented through parties and their representatives at all levels of government. This strategy should as a default support the foreign policy determined by the governing party and not seek to undermine it for party political gain, a party or individual representative should only contradict the “national negotiation” led by the government in exceptional circumstances. Ultimate responsibility for “herding cats”, making representatives sing from the same hymn sheet, should lie with the Party Presidents at Federal level, assisted by Party Presidents at state level.
The problem with that of course is the history of connection with United Front organisations that most Party State Presidents have, eg Phillip Ruddock of the NSW Liberal Party. Members will have to vote for new leadership that has a clear position on how they will engage with CCP influence. They will also need to look for new sources of funding, even (gasp !) consider making their organisations more member friendly and attracting more new members who pay fees and attend fee charging events instead of keeping parties small and cliquey and surviving financially by shopping influence for cash.
Four Main Categories of CCP Influence:
1 Official Representation:
This refers to activities that are formally and openly organised by the representatives of the Chinese government in Australia, which would include events like the HKETO celebration of the crushing of freedom in Hong Kong. It is normal for foreign governments to hold such events, the complicating factors are:
Permanent differences - China is run for and on behalf of one party, and the CCP has always been and will always be hostile to countries and organisations it does not control.
Current problems - Our attempts to resist influence and interference have been met with extreme aggression and some pundits still think a return to the pre 2017 status quo is possible. History shows no-one has ever successfully surrendered to the CCP, that is to say, we cannot simply back down, whatever concessions are made, more will be required. Resistance is difficult, but surrender is futile. Nevertheless, at some point in the future, the current hostilities may decrease somewhat and more normal interactions may for a time become possible, despite the permanent differences that will ensure hostility will resume periodically.
Code of Conduct For Dealing With PRC Official Local Representation:
Individual MP’ s should always avoid being used as a CCP sock puppet, with their passive attendance used to imply official party or government consent of CCP policy or actions, for example attendance at a celebration of the CCP’s trashing of liberty in Hong Kong.
In the current environment no official events should be attended by political representatives, the “求同存异 - qiu tong cun yi - setting aside differences” concession should not be made by rogue MPs acting unilaterally to undermine the nation while the federal government negotiates the current outstanding issues.
A potential exception is where the opportunity to address an audience is given. In the context of the dinner celebrating 25 years of Hong Kong under CCP rule, a speech excoriating the actions of the CCP and consistent with Australia’s official position would be appropriate, if uncomfortable and unwelcome by the hosts.
2 United Front Groups:
United Front Groups are coordinated by the United Front Work Department in Beijing. The purpose is to use Australian Citizens loyal to China to serve China in Australia. For the average organisation member, however, these organisations probably just feel like harmless social clubs. Most members probably like Australia and want to help Australia by making it do what China wants which they think would be good for us. They are often pleasant and kind people. They vote.
Code of Conduct For Dealing With United Front Groups:
MP’s must never passively attend a study session (as Minns and O’Dea appear to have - photo and news link currently unavailable). Pen and paper in hand, listening to a monologue, reminiscent of Party meetings shown on Chinese state media. MP’s should only attend as a speaker, and speak boldly to reflect Australia’s ambitions and interests in line with the federal governments message. For many in the audience, it is the only way they will ever hear Australia’s side of the story due to the stranglehold on Chinese language media and their “programming” through the Chinese educational system and “patriotic education”. This will probably not facilitate a second invitation, and will cost votes and funding.
3 Chinese Language Media:
Radio, print and online Chinese language media, with the exception of Fa Lun Gong publications, all have CCP links and supply Chinese state media sourced news and commentary, as well as recycling mainstream Australian media news, but crucially with editing of information that does not fit the CCP narrative and “新闻舆论管理 - xinwen yulun guanli - public opinion management” rules. Their own journalists create articles that (where relevant) support CCP information warfare goals.
Wechat and Weibo Chinese social media apps are explicitly subject to the propaganda guidelines of the CCP, thus when an Australian Prime Minister (Morrison) tried to put the Australian government’s point of view forward, to persuade Chinese language readers of his viewpoint, first individual articles were censored, then his entire account was removed. The legal means by which this occurred is convoluted, but the system was set up to achieve this power.
Kevin Rudd on the other hand is free to hide behind CCP controlled Wei Bo to vent one-sided attacks on the Liberal party and the Australian government, aided and abetted by CCP censorship, on his 700 000 follower WeiBo account. There is no way to insert a rebuttal comment into the feed, since a pro-Australian viewpoint would be censored, and it is flooded with vile anti Australian vitriol from his followers. This undermines our nations efforts to build support for the Australian case among migrants from China, and Chinese in China who may have interest in our issues.
The strong stepping up of Chinese language media by ABC, SBS, and The Australian newspaper should be applauded and supported. Advances in machine translation and hiring of more bilingual journalists makes making a Chinese language version of mainstream media more viable, and could help challenge the PRC / CCP narratives of events, people and situations. In the meantime most Chinese language media is effective at shaping and enhancing political and social barriers between new migrants to Australia from the PRC and the wider population, and the CCP and opportunistic Australian politicians can benefit by pandering to the CCP’s false narrative.
Code of Conduct For Dealing With Chinese Language Media
No one in public life should use Wechat or Weibo. To do so is to endorse the CCPs “right” to control, monitor and restrict public discourse. Wechat censored a PM. That should have led to the immediate blocking of all forms of Chinese controlled social media in Australia. Perversely it got little reaction, but it is high time for some solidarity. If Chinese in Australia want to interact with politicians using social media, this can be done with a secondary account using Chinese language on Facebook or Twitter.
When giving interviews with Chinese language media, stick to the national script, and avoid undermining national policy. Afterwards check what was written and how it was reported. Remember you are unable to use Chinese social media to engage with this audience if you are not parroting the CCP line. You can at least use other forms of media to highlight how you have been misrepresented and defend yourself before others spot it. And we plan to spot it (see article 4 in this series).
4 Think Tanks
ACRI:
Prairie Fire blasted ACRI in our July 8 document on discourse power and Ambassador Xiao Qian. The Australia China Relations Institute was set up with a $1.8 million grant from now expelled United Front figure Huang Xiang Mo (黄向墨), and we previously asserted that much funding came from Chinese state enterprises operating in Australia and companies with business in China, which is not entirely correct. The last three annual reports shows more than 80 % of annual funding comes from the UTS directly. This creates the potential for ACRI to one day become relatively financially independent of Chinese influence, but that would require the UTS itself to be independent of CCP influence, and require a wholesale replacement of staff particularly at the top and a dramatic reform process. An analysis of the reports ACRI have completed in the past demonstrates they echo the CCP narrative and work to undermine Australian unity and confidence in our ability to work to frustrate China’s bullying and interference.
China Matters:
China Matters appears to be a Labor / CCP leaning organisation, which is primarily funded by Australian private sector donors and until 2019 received some Federal government funding. They were planning to take Federal Senator James Paterson and WA MP Andrew Hastie on a trip to China to meet with CCP controlled think tanks (there are no other kind inside China), but they were subsequently denied visas. In any case all their discussions would have been with CCP ideologues who would have repeated the party line that can be read in the People’s Daily, daily.
To get a flavour of China Matters activities, you can listen to this 2018 podcast (Festival of Dangerous ideas) where Jason Yat Sen Li brings his pal, Zhao Hai, a professional propagandist from China to sell the idea to the Australian public that Australia should dump the US and join team CCP. Linda Jakobsen claps along while Adam Ni wrings his hands a bit. An example of the asymetrical nature of information warfare where China can influence Australian audiences but we can’t do anything like that in China.
Code of Conduct For Dealing with Think Tanks
ACRI and China Matters are probably best for politicians to ignore entirely, don’t give them respect or credibility. If it seems like a chance to bat for Australia, MP’s could participate in their events as speakers, bringing a feisty fighting spirit and support for sovereignty, freedom, and democracy. The CCP call it information warfare for a good reason - if you don’t fight you lose. A rule of thumb is that if Australians can’t do something in China, China and it’s allies should not be permitted to do it here.
next: article 3 of 4 discusses how to get politicians aligned in the national negotiation.